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Abstract
Subliminal perception occurs when prime stimuli that participants claim not to be aware of nevertheless influence
subsequent processing of a target. This claim, however, critically depends on correct methods to assess prime awareness.
Typically, d9 (‘‘d prime’’) tasks administered after a priming task are used to establish that people are unable to discriminate
between different primes. Here, we show that such d9 tasks are influenced by the nature of the target, by attentional factors,
and by the delay between stimulus presentation and response. Our results suggest that the standard d9 task is not a
straightforward measure of prime visibility. We discuss the implications of our findings for subliminal perception research.
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Introduction
While the existence of unconscious perception is now endorsed
by many authors (e.g. [1]), there is continuing debate about the
extent of its influence (e.g., [2]–[6]). Assessing awareness is
obviously critical in making inferences about unconscious
perception. Early subliminal perception research simply resorted
to asking participants whether they could see the shortly presented
stimuli or not. Such subjective methods, however, soon attracted
considerable criticism [7], of which the most important was their
lack of sensitivity: Participants are likely to fail to report conscious
contents when they lack confidence in their perceptual judgements
(‘‘the underconfidence phenomenon’’, e.g., [8]).
In this and other fields (e.g., implicit learning research, see [9]),
researchers thus began preferring objective measures such as
participants’ ability to choose amongst several alternatives which
stimulus they have been exposed to subliminally. Amongst such
measures, the Signal Detection Theory sensitivity measure d9 [10]
has now become the standard way of assessing awareness. A
dissociation logic is applied: if primes exert an indirect influence on
participants behavior (mostly shown by reaction times in an
indirect task), but fail to reach awareness in a direct d9 test, one
can argue that primes were unconsciously processed during the
priming task.
Thus, after completion of the main priming task, participants
are typically asked to perform a forced-choice recognition task on
the prime stimuli. One can thus compute d9 for each participant,
based on the z-scores for hit rates and false alarm rates. A d9 close
to zero is interpreted as a lack of conscious access. Different d9
tasks have been used, such as detection tasks [11] or identification
tasks [12]. After Holender’s [13] critical review, d9 tasks have been
further improved, specifically by ensuring that the priming task
and the d9 task are as comparable as possible, as suggested by
Reingold and Merikle [14]. Most modern paradigms aimed at
exploring priming effects meet the first three criteria of Reingold
and Merikle: Prime-target sequences are presented in exactly the
same way in both phases (‘‘task context’’ criterion), participants
perform the same task twice, once on the targets and once on the
primes (‘‘stimulus states’’ criterion’’), and should not be influenced
by a response bias (‘‘perceptual sensitivity’’ criterion’’). However,
Reingold and Merikle’s fourth criterion (‘‘same response metric’’)
is typically not fulfilled. Researchers often use a continuous metric
for the priming task (e.g., reaction times) and a discrete measure
for the awareness test (seen/not seen judgments).
There are reasons to believe, however, that the current focus on
keeping the priming and the d9 tasks as comparable as possible has
resulted in several potentially problematic issues insofar as
assessing awareness is concerned. Thus, while we agree that the
claim of unconscious perception is established, at least in a
functional sense, when d9 is zero, one cannot claim that primes
were actually not consciously perceived at the time they were
presented. Other factors, such as target interference, might hinder
participants’ ability to report on primes they were weakly aware of
at the time of presentation. We have identified three such factors.
The first concerns how attention is distributed. In a priming
task, participants are told to ignore the primes and to focus on
responding to the targets. In the d9 task, however, participants are
told to focus on the primes while ignoring the targets. While this
ensures that participants find themselves in the best conditions to
identify the primes, and hence minimizes the likelihood of
erroneously concluding that they were unaware of the primes,
no study has assessed the influence of this factor on d9
performance. The influence of the distribution of attention has,
however, been investigated for prime identification tasks. Thus,
Dark [15] reported no difference in accuracy between a group that
had to perform a target naming task and a prime identification on
each trial compared to a group that had to perform only prime
identification on each trial. In contrast, Dagenbach, Carr and
Wilhelmsen [16] reported an influence of the type of measure of
prime visibility (i.e., detection or discrimination versus semantic
similarity) on the priming effect in a subsequent block, indicating
that irrelevant attentional factors influence how primes are
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performance for conditions in which participants are allowed to
focus on the primes with conditions in which attention is divided
between primes and targets.
Second, participants’ responses in the d9 task are likely to be
influenced by the presence of the target. This could increase the
visibility of the primes when prime and target are semantically
related [15], [17], [18]. However, the target could also result in
decreased prime visibility because its processing interferes with
processing of the prime. Crucially, impaired ability to inhibit a
response to the target has little to do with prime awareness. Here,
we approached this question by comparing performance in a
standard d9 task with a d9 task in which targets were neutral and
hence failed to elicit directed responses while nevertheless masking
the primes in the same way.
Finally, participants’ responses may depend on temporal factors,
specifically the duration of the interval between prime presentation
and response. If consciousness takes time [19], we would expect
the weak traces resulting from prime presentation to grow stronger
with increasing duration. We therefore manipulated the time (i.e.,
immediately vs. after an 800 ms delay) at which participants had
to respond during the d9 task.
To summarize, we sought to systematically explore, in a single
within-subjects design, the effects of attention, target valence, and
temporal factors on prime visibility.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The study received ethics committee approval by the authorities
responsible for our institution (ULB), Comite ´ d’Ethique Facultaire
Sciences Psychologiques et de l’Education. All participants have
signed the informed consent.
Participants
18 students (4 males, 14 females; mean age: 20 years) enrolled at
the Universite ´ Libre de Bruxelles were compensated 7 euros for
their participation.
Material and stimuli
The experiment was carried out on a computer using E-prime
version 2.0. Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor using a
refresh rate of 75 Hz. Participants were seated 60 cm from the
screen. Stimuli were adapted from Vorberg et al. [20]. Primes
were black arrows pointing leftwards or rightwards shown on a
white background. Primes subtended a visual angle of 1,72u width
and 0,47u height. Targets were larger (subtending 3,44u width and
0,67u height) and also had a left- or rightward orientation. The
mask was embedded in the target in the form of a white shape that
covered the surface of both prime arrows. Neutral targets had the
same appearance as arrow targets, but were rectangular and hence
not directional.
Procedure
The experiment started with a priming block in which people
were kept unaware about the primes. Participants first performed
10 practice trials and were then asked to perform 6 blocks of 48
trials, with a short pause between each block. On each trial
(Figure 1), a fixation cross was first presented for 700 ms. The
prime arrow was then presented for 13 ms and was immediately
followed by a blank screen of variable duration (13, 27, 40, 53, 67
or 80 ms). Immediately thereafter, the target arrow was presented
for 140 ms. Both prime and target arrows were presented either
5% above or 5% below the middle of the screen. Finally, a
question mark was displayed until participants had responded to
the direction of the target arrow by pressing the most leftward or
the most rightward key on the response box. Both reaction times
and accuracy were recorded. The intertrial interval consisted of a
blank screen displayed for 100 ms.
This design thus generates 48 trial types obtained by crossing
SOA (6 levels), stimulus position (2 levels: above or below fixation),
prime arrow direction (2 levels), and target arrow direction (2
levels). Each trial type was repeated 6 times and was presented in
random order over the different blocks, resulting in a total of 288
trials per block.
After the priming task, participants were informed about the
presence of the primes. An example of prime and target stimuli
Figure 1. Trialprocedure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031595.g001
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the task would be to detect the orientation of the prime arrows.
Each participant performed three awareness tests on three
separate blocks. The first awareness test (‘‘standard d9 test’’)
followed exactly the same design as the priming blocks. Only the
instructions changed: Participants were now told to respond to the
direction of the prime arrow instead of responding to the direction
of the target arrow, which they were instructed to ignore.
In the second test (‘‘neutral target test’’), the same procedure
was used but the target arrows were now replaced by the neutral
target. In the third test (‘‘switch test’’), participants now had to
identify the orientation of the prime arrows on half of the trials and
the orientation of the target arrows on the other half of the trials.
Which task had to be performed was indicated on a trial-to-trial
basis through the identity of the target: People had to respond to
the direction of the prime when the target was neutral, and to the
direction of the target arrow when it was not.
The ‘‘standard d9 test’’ and the ‘‘neutral target test’’ each
consisted of 144 trials (each trial type was repeated three times)
presented in random order. The ‘‘switch test’’ consisted of 288
trials (144 prime identification trials and 144 target identification
trials). The order of the tests was randomized across subjects.
Finally, each test was administered twice, once with a delay and
once without a delay. In the delay condition, the question mark
was presented for 800 ms during which participants could not
respond and were instructed not to do so. After 800 ms, the
question mark became red as a signal for participants to respond.
The order of the delay and non-delay block was counterbalanced
across participants. Thus, a participant who had started one test in
the delay condition started the other two tests with a delay. The
entire experiment lasted 50 minutes.
Results
Priming
Figure 2 shows the median reaction times (RTs) elicited by
congruent and incongruent stimuli presented at different SOAs
during the priming task. RTs are slower for incongruent than for
congruent trials, with the difference increasing with increasing
SOAs.
These impressions were confirmed by an ANOVA with two
within-subject factors: Congruency (2 levels: congruent vs.
incongruent prime-target pairs) and SOA (6 levels: 13, 27, 40,
53, 67 or 80 ms). We observed a main effect of Congruency
(F(1,17)=85.52, p,.001, g
2=.83) with congruent trials eliciting
faster responses (mean 336 ms, SE=17 ms) than incongruent
trials (mean 402 ms, SE=14 ms) and a main effect of SOA
(F(5,13)=5.13, p,.01, g
2=.66). The interaction was also
significant (F(5,13)=7.27, p,.01, g
2=.74); the effect of congru-
ency increased with increasing SOAs. Importantly, the congruen-
cy effect was significant for each SOA separately at a level of
p,.001 as shown by separate contrasts.
Awareness
Next, we analyzed the results of the awareness tests. We first
calculated d9 separately for each subject and each condition and
averaged the computed values separately for each of the six
conditions obtained by crossing the factors Type of Test (3 levels:
Standard, Neutral Target, or Switch) and Delay (2 levels: 0 ms vs.
800 ms). The results appear in Figure 3, plotted separately for
each SOA (6 levels: 13, 27, 40, 53, 67 or 80 ms). We analyzed the
dataset by means of an ANOVA with three within-subject factors:
Type of Test, Delay, and SOA. We observed a main effect of
Delay (F(1,17)=18.28, p=.001, g
2=.52, with larger d9s for the
800 ms condition (mean 1.54, SE=.21) than for the 0 ms
condition (mean 1.11, SE=.20). There was also a main effect of
SOA (F(5,13)=6.76, p,.01, g
2=.72), with larger SOAs eliciting
larger d9s. Finally, the main effect for Type of Test was also
significant (F(2,16)=17.23, p,.001, g
2=.68), with the highest d9
for the ‘‘neutral target test’’ (mean=2.04, SE=.29), a lower d9 for
the ‘‘switch test’’ (mean=1.32, SE=.21) and the lowest d9 for the
‘‘standard d9 test’’ (mean=.62, SE=.16). We looked into more
detail into the responses for the ‘‘standard d9 test’’. They
corresponded more often than chance level to the target response
for the lowest SOA’s (for SOA 13 ms: t(17)=2.79, p=.01; for
SOA 27 ms: t(17)=2.81, p=.01; for SOA 40 ms: t(17)=2.15,
p,.05) and not for the highest SOA’s. Two important contrasts
were analyzed: d9 for the ‘‘neutral target test’’ was significantly
higher than d9 for the ‘‘switch test’’ (F(1,17)=17.82, p=.001,
g
2=.51) and d9 for the ‘‘neutral target test’’ was significantly
higher than d9 for the ‘‘standard d9 test’’ (F(1,17)=34.80, p,.001,
g
2=.67). The difference between the ‘‘neutral target test’’ and the
‘‘standard d9 test’’ was also significantly higher than the difference
between the ‘‘neutral target test’’ and the ‘‘switch test’’
(F(1,17)=26,92, p,.001, g
2=.61).
All two-way interactions (Delay*SOA (F(5,13)=2.37, p=.10,
g
2=.48, Delay*Type of Test test (F(2,16)=1.31, p=.30, g
2=.14)
and SOA*Type of Test (F(10,8)=2.10, p=.15, g
2=.72) failed to
reach significance. The three-way interaction Timing*SOA*Type
of Test was, however, significant (F(10,8)=3.56, p,.05, g
2=.82),
with d9 values increasing more rapidly with SOA when there was a
delay than when there was no delay, especially for the neutral
target test.
To find out whether d9 was significantly different from zero for
the lower SOAs, a t-test was performed for each condition
separately. All values were significantly different from zero
(threshold p,.05), except for the switch test at SOA 13 ms
without a delay (t(17)=.44, p=.67), for the standard d9 test at
SOA 13 ms without a delay (t(17)=.93, p=.37), for the switch test
at SOA 27 ms without a delay (t(17)=2.03, p=.06), for the
standard d9 test at SOA 27 ms without a delay (t(17)=2.38,
p=.71) and for the standard d9 test at 13 ms with a delay
(t(17)=1.87, p=.08).
Discussion
We observed a clear influence of different variations of the d9
task on the resulting d9 values. First, dividing attention over prime
and target decreased d9 values. This suggests that d9 values are
overestimated when using the standard d9 task because partici-
pants are not required to pay attention to the primes during the
priming blocks. They usually do not even know about their
presence. Directing participants’ attention to the primes leads to
higher visibility of the primes. An alternative explanation could be
Figure 2. Mean RTs and SEs during priming blocks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031595.g002
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overall accuracy (e.g., when considering prime and target
identification together). Indeed, not only is it the case that the
focus of attention differs between priming and target task, but the
two tasks are also very different in how difficult they are to
perform. This difference could for example demotivate partici-
pants. Congruently, Pratte & Rouder [21] observed an increase in
performance accuracy in the awareness test when the test was
made easier by mixing short prime presentations with longer
presentations. Under such conditions, they even reported a lack of
priming effects when controlling for difficulty, although this latter
result was subsequently countered by Finkbeiner [22]. On the
other hand, one could also argue that the divided attention block
was more difficult, because task-switching was required. Whether
task difficulty contributes to the explanation of our findings will
have to be explored in further research.
However, a larger effect was observed for the presence of
valenced targets during the d9 task. Participants are impaired in
detecting the primes with valenced targets because they tend to
report the direction of the targets instead of the direction of the
primes. This results in an underestimation of d9 in the standard d9
task since failure to inhibit targets does not imply that the primes
were not visible at the moment they were presented. Because this
underestimation effect was larger than the overestimation effect,
we can conclude that in general d9 values are underestimated
using standard d9 tasks.
Further, we observed an effect of the timing of responses in the
d9 task. Higher d9 values were observed when participants had to
wait before responding. This response delay has been introduced
by Vorberg et al. [20] and subsequently adopted by other research
groups (e.g. [23]). The argument for using a delay is that responses
in the d9 task are not only influenced by conscious processes, but
also by unconscious information [24]–[26]. Since unconscious
processes generally exert their influence in a very short time
window, the delay should diminish the influence of these
unconscious processes and lead to a smaller d9 value. In contrast,
we observed increased d9s with a delay. We hypothesize,
congruently with Cleeremans & Sarrazin [27] (see also [19]), that
this results from the fact that developing conscious representations
takes time. Hence, increased — rather than decreased —
accessibility is expected after a (short) delay.
Finally, it is important to note that our findings are based on
metacontrast stimuli (adapted from [20]) rather than on the more
popular pattern masking stimuli used in most priming research.
Further experiments are necessary to establish whether our
findings extend to such pattern masking methods. Further, we
used an identification task as the awareness measure. However,
other authors have argued that detection tasks are more sensitive
[28]–[30]. While we agree that detection is a more sensitive
measure than identification per se, we argue that the identification
task we have used is the correct measure in this context. As
Snodgrass at al. [30] stated, the awareness measure ‘‘need not be
sensitive to absolutely all conscious perception, but rather only to
relevant conscious perception — namely, to the kind(s) of
conscious perception that would be necessary at a minimum, for
the effects of interest to occur’’ (p. 850). Here, the effect of interest
is the influence of prime-target congruency on target reaction
time. The minimum information necessary for such effects to
occur is the identification of the direction to which the prime
arrow is pointing. Merely detecting the presence of the arrow
(arrow or no arrow?) may, in contrast, be based exclusively on low-
level sensory details, such as luminance differences ([28]) and
cannot result in congruency effects. Thus, a lack of awareness of
prime direction (as established through identification) is sufficient
to infer unconscious congruency effects.
Conclusion
Recently, some have again argued for the subjective approach
[31]–[34]. However, this approach still faces the same issues as it
did 50 years ago. Objective measures are essential when assessing
awareness. We argue for a multi-pronged approach that involves
both subjective and objective measures [35]. It is crucial, however,
that the d9 task be correctly designed for inferences about
unconscious processing to be valid. Our revised d9 task suggests
the following: First, valenced targets should be avoided or replaced
with neural targets. Second, attention on the primes should be
distributed in the same way between the awareness test and the
priming task. Finally, a delay should be provided so that
representations of the weak prime stimulus can build up and
their likelihood of becoming conscious representations is increased.
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